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How Peace Keeping Becomes Intervention: Lessons from the Lebanese Experience

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The end of the cold war opened new frontiers for international peace-keeping forces. Five operations were deployed by the United Nations in 1987, but seventeen missions fielding seventy thousand soldiers were in place in 1994. More impressive than the number of forces was the diversity of their missions. While UN peace-keepers continued to carry out traditional tasks, such as patrolling buffer zones between former belligerents, "second-generation" forces often undertook more ambitious mandates. They were called upon to disarm rebel movements, organize elections, and deliver humanitarian relief in hostile situations (Weiss 1993; Boutros-Ghali 1992c; Coate and Puchala 1990; Mackinlay and Chopra 1992; Anderson 1992).

In its classic conception, peace-keeping is the antithesis of intervention. Peace-keepers are supposed to be strictly neutral in their behavior toward parties in a conflict, whereas intervention aims either to alter or to preserve the authority structures of a target state. Moreover, peace-keepers adhere to highly restrictive rules of engagement, using force only for self-defense, whereas interveners have recourse to military means to assist the party they favor in a conflict (James 1990; Rikhye and Skjelsbaek 1991; Skjelsbaek 1989; Diehl 1988; Rosenau 1973; Little 1975; Weinberger 1986).

By these criteria, peace-keeping has been most successful in cases

of interstate hostilities, where former belligerents have consented to the deployment of international forces after achieving a diplomatic agreement. Examples include the United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai Peninsula (UNEF I from 1956 to 1967 and UNEF II from 1973 to 1982) as well as the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (from 1974 until the present). Similarly, the Multinational Force and Observers deployed in the Sinai under American initiative since 1982 has followed the traditional model and performed its mission unchallenged.

More problematic are cases in which international forces are interposed in the midst of a civil conflict. Where civil conflict persists, efforts to adhere to peace-keeping norms are necessarily strained. Impartiality is virtually impossible, for the international force is generally identified with central authorities rather than insurgent forces. Restrictive rules of engagement are breached when "peace-keepers" resort to enforcement measures, whether to fulfill their designated mandate, to restore stability, or to fill the vacuum of authority in the troubled state. Even if those who sent the international force or those participating in it wish to maintain neutrality and avoid the use of force, the environment militates against these intentions.

As a result, to fulfill their mandate international forces may easily be drawn into enforcement actions better labeled as "collective intervention" (Luard 1984). Tensions and ambiguities may arise when the authorizing mandate of the force does not anticipate such eventualities, and when there is insufficient political will on the part of troop contributors and interested parties to broaden the terms of the force's mandate. In the first such instance, the Congo mission deployed by the United Nations in 1960-1964 aroused intense controversy between the superpowers and engendered wariness about deploying international forces in civil conflicts (Hoffmann 1962; Lefever 1967; O'Brien 1962).

Nonetheless, in the wake of the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975, unilateral interventions by neighbors were followed by the deployment of two distinct international forces. The experiences of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (deployed from 1978 to the present) and the Multinational Force in Beirut (1982-1984) reveal many of the potential pitfalls of collective intervention and provide lessons that may be usefully applied to the new challenges facing peace-keepers in the post-cold-war era.

Choice of Auspices

One reason that the Lebanese case is so interesting to students of international organization is that the modalities of intervention in this

conflict varied in accordance with regional and international trends. The first instance of unilateral intervention in the civil war that began in 1975 was initiated by Syria and subsequently gained the regional sanction of the Arab League. The loose bipolar system of the mid-1970's was permissive of intervention by aspiring regional powers, especially in areas marginal to superpower interests. Accordingly, Syria could intervene in Lebanon in 1976 without significant constraints by either its Soviet patron or the United States.

Syria's motives for intervening in Lebanon were both bilateral and transnational. On the bilateral level, Syria wished to ensure that Lebanon would emerge from its civil conflict with a government that was congenial and deferential to Syria, avoiding the dangers of victory by either the Lebanese right (which might partition the country along ethnic lines, prompting contagious ethnic unrest in Syria) or by the Lebanese left (which might trigger an unwanted confrontation with Israel through its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization). On a transnational level, Syria sought to assert its own dominance over the PLO, which was using Lebanon as its major base of guerrilla operations against Israel. Syria demanded that the PLO sever its identifications with the goals of the Lebanese left. The PLO's refusal to comply led to an all-out military conflict between Syria and the PLO from June to October 1976.

Until June 1976, the Arab League, as the regional organization authorized to express consensual Arab goals, neither sanctioned nor condemned Syria's unilateral intervention in Lebanon. Implicitly recognizing the paramountcy of Syria's claim as the regional power with the deepest interests in Lebanon, other Arab states advanced support for contenders in the Lebanese conflict but did not challenge Syria's initiative. Only after Syria launched its attack on the PLO did the Arab League respond to a plea by Chairman Yasir Arafat, deciding in June on "the formation of symbolic Arab security forces under the auspices of the Secretary General of the Arab League . . . to replace the Syrian forces," (Khywayri 1977, 2:369-71). Yet only token forces from several Arab states were deployed alongside the thirty thousand Syrian troops then in Lebanon.

The cease-fire agreement mediated by the Arab League in October 1976 called for a cessation of Syria's onslaught against the PLO and a reaffirmation of the right of the guerrilla organization to operate in southern Lebanon. Syria's forces in Lebanon were now designated as part of an Arab Deterrent Force, which was supposed to have other Arab troop contributors and to be funded by the Arab League. The practical effect of this decision was to grant Syria's unilateral intervention the imprimatur of regional legitimation, as well as financing. In

fact, troop contributions by other Arab states were limited and short-lived, whereas Syrian forces continued to be deployed in a "peace-keeping" capacity in Lebanon (primarily in the eastern Bika and the north) in the mid-1990's.

The second unilateral intervention in Lebanon's civil conflict was initiated by Israel in 1978 and precipitated the deployment of UNIFIL. Israel's motives for intervening in Lebanon were transnational, responding to guerrilla raids launched by the Palestinian Resistance (the PLO and associated guerrilla groups) against northern Israel. The Litani Operation conducted by Israel in March-June 1978 was the culmination of a long-standing reprisal policy against Palestinian raids, which had intensified with Syrian encouragement in early 1978.

The decision to create UNIFIL was taken by the Security Council on March 19, 1978, four days after the Israeli invasion began. Resolution 425 defined UNIFIL's objectives as "confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area." The United States took the initiative for UNIFIL's creation for reasons UN undersecretary-general Brian Urquhart characterized as follows: "When UNIFIL was put in in 1978, why was there this wild enthusiasm on the part of the United States? . . . Because they were bang in the middle of the Camp David process, . . . and the process could not go ahead if nothing was being done about the Israelis in south Lebanon" (interview with author, January 20, 1983).

The introduction of United Nations peace-keeping forces as a mechanism for reversing unilateral intervention by an external power had many precedents. Indeed, Israel's occupation of the Sinai in 1956 was reversed through the deployment of the first UN Emergency Force (1956-1967). Its reoccupation of the Sinai in 1967 was partially reversed after the October 1973 war with the introduction of UNEF II (1973-1982). Then, Israel withdrew from a segment of the Golan Heights, occupied in 1967, and the UN Disengagement Observer Force was created in 1974.

Ostensibly, therefore, in deploying UNIFIL the United Nations was acting within a long tradition of using a buffer force to separate former combatants in an interstate conflict. The critical difference was that Lebanon was still immersed in civil conflict. The absence of central government authority, especially in southern Lebanon, presented special dilemmas that were not adequately anticipated by the framers of resolution 425. When the Security Council indicated that one of the UNIFIL's objectives was "assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area," it woefully underestimated what the fulfillment of that condition would entail.

Why, after Israel again invaded Lebanon in 1982, was the UN bypassed in favor of a multilateral peace-keeping force? This decision reflected a broader trend toward multilateralism during the 1980's, rather than a specific reassessment of the peace-keeping mechanism. The United States especially was disenchanted with the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations and therefore had increased recourse to multilateral diplomacy to tackle security dilemmas and seek international economic cooperation. This trend was reflected, for example, in the formation of the Namibia Contact Group and in the Contadora peace process in Central America (Karns 1986 and 1987). The American renunciation of UN leadership need not be attributed to an overall decline in American hegemony, but rather to a calculated preference for mobilizing more congenial groups to address specific issues (Haas 1986).

In a departure from previous practice, the United States recruited ten national contingents to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, as part of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. In this case, multinational auspices were chosen by default, in view of the threat of a Soviet veto in the Security Council for establishment of a UN peace-keeping force. American decision-makers viewed the smooth initiation of the MFO as an auspicious precedent when they decided, in the aftermath of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, to send a multinational force to Beirut in cooperation with Italy and France. Yet the Sinai precedent was actually irrelevant because of fundamental contextual disparity between the MFO buffer operation and the Beirut civil strife arena.

In a decision to deploy an international force, context—that is, the nature of the conflict environment, whether interstate or intrastate—is the critical variable in determining whether the operation will be able to adhere to traditional peace-keeping norms of neutrality and restrictive rules of engagement. United Nations buffer forces, such as those in the Sinai and the Golan Heights, lived up to these criteria throughout their deployment. The Sinai MFO, too, adhered to the same model. By contrast, UNIFIL, the UN operation in the Congo, and to a lesser extent the UN Force in Cyprus (1964–present), deviated from peace-keeping ideals because of the troubled circumstances of civil strife in which they were deployed.

Yet the choice of auspices may independently affect the capacity of international forces to conform to peace-keeping norms, especially in a context of civil strife. Indeed, multinational auspices accentuate the propensity to become embroiled in collective intervention. An ad hoc operation lacks the restraints imposed by international organizations through adherence to precedents or established decision-making

mechanisms. An absence of precedents may allow greater flexibility to a multinational force, but it also permits partisanship and fosters an impulse toward military engagement.

In Lebanon's civil conflict, the composition and mandate of the Multinational Force in Beirut (in its two incarnations, August–September 1982 and September 1982–February 1984) reinforced its tendency to identify with incumbent Lebanese authorities and increasingly to act in their behalf. A contrast between the missions and conduct of UNIFIL and the Beirut MNF underscores the relative effects of the auspices of peace-keeping operations.

The missions of UNIFIL and the MNF, though both served in Lebanon, were not symmetrical. The distinctions were already evident in the circumstances leading to the creation of each force. For one thing, Israel's objectives in invading Lebanon in 1982 were much farther reaching than those of the Litani Operation in 1978. By 1982 the security threat posed by the PLO stemmed from its buildup in conventional capabilities to the north of UNIFIL's area of operation. Moreover, Israel now had a second, bilateral goal: to influence the outcome of Lebanon's imminent presidential elections to bring to power Bashir Jumayyil, who had vowed to curb PLO influence in the country. This time, Israel was an overt intervener, intent on transforming the authority structures of the Lebanese state. A third objective of the Israeli invasion was to challenge and possibly remove Syria's sphere of influence in Lebanon (Schiff and Yaari 1984; Rabinovich 1984; Yaniv 1987).

In pursuit of these objectives, Israel exceeded the scope of its 1978 march into southern Lebanon, proceeding north to the outskirts of the Lebanese capital. It was Israel's siege of Beirut in August 1982 that precipitated the American efforts to create the MNF. U.S. special envoy Philip Habib negotiated agreements leading to the introduction of American, French, and Italian forces to oversee the evacuation of Palestinian guerrillas from the capital. The precipitous withdrawal of these peace-keepers sixteen days later was followed by massacres in Palestinian refugee camps, and a second Multinational Force was hastily introduced.

By virtue of its presence in the capital, the Beirut MNF was more inclined to become embroiled in Lebanon's civil conflict than was UNIFIL. UNIFIL's mission was restricted to southern Lebanon, which had long been removed from central government control; whereas the second Beirut MNF sought to help the Lebanese government repossess its fundamental sphere of authority. Thus, it was more likely to become engaged in enforcement actions on behalf of the central government against its domestic opponents.

Moreover, the auspices of the MNF predisposed it to greater inter-

ventionist tendencies than a UN force would be expected to display. Aside from the greater partisanship that Western states contributing troops might display, the operational guidelines of the force allowed greater discretion to individual unit commanders than would be possible under the unified command structure typical for a UN force. Moreover, once the MNF came under challenge, the military capabilities available to the great powers could be called upon, as opposed to the meager capacities of most UN forces.

Given that a multinational force is more prone to collective intervention and less likely to conform strictly to traditional peace-keeping norms, intervention is not necessarily harmful in a given context. If a state is unable to resolve civil strife on its own and the combatants prove unreceptive to IO peace-keeping, collective intervention may be preferable to unilateral intervention. As opposed to unilateral interveners, which often act without invitation or authorization, collective interveners gain legitimacy through invitation by recognized authorities in the target state. Further, a general preference for United Nations rather than multinational auspices arises from the greater legitimacy associated with the decisions of a universal international organization (Thakur 1987).

The critical issue, therefore, is not so much whether an international force ought to intervene in civil conflicts but whether the sponsors of the force adequately anticipate the challenges inherent in its mission. What must be assessed is the effectiveness of peace-keeping operations—that is, the ability of an international force to carry out its assigned mission in conformity with its mandate. In a civil conflict environment, troop contributors need consensual rules of engagement and predictable mechanisms for coordination, to be able to respond to dynamic circumstances. Neither UNIFIL nor the MNF was able to perform effectively, largely because the framers of the mandates for each force underestimated the challenges posed by Lebanon's environment of civil strife.

Determinants of Effectiveness

The highly variable scenarios encountered by international forces—in terms of both context and auspices—impede systematic comparison and analysis. Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to predict or assess the effectiveness of any international military operation by identifying five critical variables. Hypotheses may be advanced about the circumstances that would maximize force effectiveness with respect to each of these variables.

One set of determinants is contextual. They define the environment within which a military operation functions and the magnitude of its task. The first and most important is consent of the parties. The degree of cooperation advanced by the host state or states (in an interstate conflict) is a major determinant of force effectiveness. Where civil strife is still intransigent, the parties (incumbents and insurgents) necessarily have different stakes in cooperating with, or undermining, an international military operation. In these circumstances, force effectiveness may be correlated with the legitimacy and relative strength of the incumbent authorities, as well as the degree to which the international force is identified with the central government. For example, if the host government is weak and its legitimacy contested and the international force is heavily committed to its support, insurgents will have a strong incentive to undermine the force mission.

The second contextual variable is the degree of peace-making that occurs prior to the introduction of the force and during its deployment. Without preliminary diplomatic efforts, an international force cannot be created and from this perspective, peace-making is a precondition to peace-keeping or collective intervention. Ultimately, success in peace-making terminates the need for the military operation, whereas a breakdown in diplomacy undermines the minimal consensus necessary for sustaining the mission of the force.

There are, in addition, three operational variables relevant to the assessment of an international military operation. Definition of the mandate is vital, and one may postulate that peace-keeping norms are more readily applied to static than to dynamic mandates. Insofar as a mandate is dynamic, effective implementation requires consensual and predictable means for interpretation and possible redefinition.

Second, there must be mechanisms for coordination among troop contributors. On an operational level, coordination is maximized by formation of a unified command structure. Several subordinate hypotheses specify conditions promoting cooperation in an international military venture, including a unified command structure; balanced distribution of influence and political heterogeneity among force contributors; compatible foreign policy interests in participating in the operation; and equitable sharing of costs and casualties.

Finally, the capabilities of an international military operation should be sufficient to ward off challenges to the integrity of its area of operation. For peace-keeping missions, adequate capabilities should be coupled with strict and restrictive rules of engagement. If troop contributors choose to redefine their mission and pursue enforcement actions, they will require precise consensual rules of engagement in order to pursue collective intervention with maximal effectiveness.

One might argue that instead of looking for determinants or measures of effectiveness, one should ask what variables will determine the outcome of the operation, its success or failure. Enormous subjectivity is involved in the interpretation of outcomes, however. Some mandates are far more ambitious than others. Comparison requires us to examine initial expectations and how these expectations evolve during the life cycle of a force.

An emphasis on vantage point—generating subjectivity in the assessment of international military operations—stems from the question of *who* is assessing performance, with what expectations and what stake in the outcome. A variety of perspectives must necessarily be taken into account: first, the parties to the (interstate or civil) conflict; second, other regional actors, as well as interested superpowers; third, troop contributors, whose impact scholars consistently underrate; and fourth, the sponsoring international organization or multinational group. Success in the eyes of one may spell failure for the other. Another problem is that the outcome of the mission is usually judged according to the success of peace-making diplomacy. If stability is achieved, observers tend to say that the international force succeeded because its presence provided the conditions for the fortunate diplomatic outcome, implying a causal connection that may not necessarily exist.

Another methodological dilemma surrounds the differential effects of context and auspices on force effectiveness. The problem here is that the choice of auspices may itself be conditioned by perceptions of the setting in which the operation will take place. An IO such as the United Nations may be precluded from involvement in an interstate or civil conflict if an enabling resolution is blocked by the veto of a member of the Security Council (as in the case of the threatened Soviet veto of a United Nations force in the Sinai to monitor the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty) or by the unwillingness of parties to a conflict to submit the issue for consideration by the international organization (as is often the case when Third World states experience civil conflicts and as also occurred for much of the duration of the Iran-Iraq War). Once the UN has authorized creation of an international force, however, there has rarely been difficulty in recruiting troop contributors, subject to the organization's guidelines for geographic diversity and screening by the host state. Even in the case of the Congo, where the UN force engaged in heavy-handed enforcement actions and sustained heavy casualties, a wide variety of troop contributors participated without protest.

By contrast, perceptions of physical and political risk appear to weigh more heavily in decisions to participate in a multinational under-

taking. In view of pervasive Arab criticism of the Camp David accords and the resulting Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the United States had great difficulty recruiting participants for the Multinational Force and Observers, even among its European allies. For this buffer force, according to Scott Gudgeon, legal adviser to the MFO, risk perceptions declined as the peace process stabilized and no challenge was mounted its presence (interview with the author, November 1984).

In the Beirut Multinational Force, on the other hand, risk perception grew dramatically as the force came under challenge. The MNF troop contributors—the United States, France, Italy, and subsequently Britain—clearly underestimated the dangers. Although there is no basis for concluding that the choice of multinational (rather than UN) auspices was made in anticipation of higher risks, one may argue that once a commitment to participation has been made, troop contributors are more prone to engage in intervention under multinational auspices (James 1984).

Contextual Variables

It is worth making a general observation, however simplistic, that the easier the task assigned to an international force, the greater the chance of performing that task effectively. Contextual variables define the setting within which a force functions and the magnitude of the task it must perform. In addition to the type of conflict in which it is interposed (whether interstate or civil), the magnitude of a force's task is determined by two other parameters: the intensity of the conflict and the stage of combat (which affects the will of combatants to persist).

The two contextual variables—consent of the parties and the degree of progress in peace-making—may be viewed as preconditions to the creation of an international force. As dynamic factors, these variables continue to be redefined throughout the peace-keepers' mission, down to the moment when their contingents withdraw.

Consent of the Parties

Consent of the parties is the paramount determinant of effectiveness as well as the prime distinguishing characteristic between operations. Who are the parties to an agreement to deploy an international force? When the parties are states, as in the case of former belligerents, the degree of cooperation advanced by the host state or states is crucial. For example, as long as Egypt and Israel supported the mission of UNEF I in the Sinai, the operation performed flawlessly; conversely,

the withdrawal of Egyptian support in May 1967 doomed the peace-keeping effort (Elaraby 1983; Comay 1983).

Amid civil strife, by contrast, an international force rarely enjoys the support of all parties to the conflict. If incumbent authorities request the deployment, insurgents may view the force as partisan and seek to undermine it. This polarization of attitudes is more likely if the operation is committed to support the host government and to perform functions (for example, army and police functions) that the challenged authorities cannot. The more contested the legitimacy of the central government, the more the outsiders' commitment negates the appearance of neutrality between the parties to civil strife. This condition is unique to civil conflict; for a buffer force, neutrality connotes impartiality between former belligerents, rather than between actors within one state (Forsythe 1969).

Who were the relevant parties in Lebanon whose consent was necessary for UNIFIL and the Multinational Force to carry out their tasks effectively? One must emphasize that by 1978, Lebanon was not merely a state in which insurgents were challenging the legitimacy of incumbent authorities. In effect, Lebanon had experienced a total collapse of state authority, including the complete disintegration of the army, during the 1975–1976 civil war. After the October 1976 cease-fire took hold, the authority of the central government was primarily confined to the vicinity of Beirut, and even there it was beholden to the backing of Syria's Arab Deterrent Force. In the rest of the country, partisan militias exercised control in diverse spheres of influence. When one refers to the consent of Lebanon's central government to the deployment of either UNIFIL or the Beirut MNF, therefore, it is important to bear in mind that the government was merely one among many players, and in each case it viewed the introduction of the international force as a means of strengthening its own position vis-a-vis a variety of domestic contestants.

The weakness of Lebanon's central government was less critical to the functioning of UNIFIL than to the operations of the Beirut MNF. After all, UNIFIL was initially deployed to facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and, in that sense, resembled the classic interstate or buffer forces previously deployed by the United Nations. UNIFIL then evolved into a hybrid interstate-intrastate force, insofar as its ability to carry out its functions was impeded by the environment in which it served. Yet because its mission was not intrinsically linked to the fate of the central government, there was no strong incentive for opponents of the regime to target UNIFIL. Instead, UNIFIL faced the challenge of coping with the efforts of local actors within

southern Lebanon to circumvent or undermine its authority within its own sphere of influence.

From the outset, geographic constraints impeded the mission. Israel refused to permit its deployment up to the international border, having embarked on Operation Litani with the declared intention of setting up a six-mile-wide "security belt" to prevent terrorist infiltration. At the end of its phased withdrawal from the Litani, Israel turned over the border enclave not to UNIFIL but to a renegade Lebanese officer, Major Sa'd Haddad. Further geographic limitations were posed by the UN decision to restrict UNIFIL's area of operation to positions that had been occupied by the Israel Defense Force. The coastal city of Tyre, which had not been penetrated, remained a PLO stronghold, and most subsequent attempts at guerrilla infiltration through UNIFIL lines originated in the "Tyre pocket." By the same principle, seventeen PLO and Lebanese National Movement emplacements were permitted to remain within UNIFIL's area of operation.

In this geographic environment, the parties whose consent UNIFIL needed in order to perform its mission effectively were not states but nonstate actors—either subnational (such as Haddad's militia) or transnational (such as the PLO). Each, in turn, was linked in a network of relationships with interested regional powers. Major Haddad served as an Israeli proxy, depending on Israel for economic, military, and logistical support. Yet he insisted that his militia was protecting the local population in the south from PLO raids, rather than providing a "security belt" for the Israeli north (interview with author November 29, 1982). On several occasions, Haddad tried to enlarge his enclave, and his militia often harassed UNIFIL soldiers.

The PLO, in turn, received Syrian acquiescence and at times encouragement for its operations in southern Lebanon. After the Syrian-PLO confrontation in 1976, the October cease-fire confirmed Palestinian freedom of operation in the south, an area understood to be off limits to Syrian forces as a result of a tacit agreement on "red lines" between Israel and Syria. Syria actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities after a Syrian-PLO rapprochement, which followed the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's diplomatic overtures toward Israel in 1977.

When Palestinian infiltration occurred through UNIFIL lines, the peace-keeping force was limited in its ability to respond. Timur Guksel, a UNIFIL spokesperson recalled:

We kept catching the same guys in most cases. . . . You are risking your life in a way. . . . it's risky at night; you can get shot easily, a lot of people did get shot. So you catch this guy, take his gun away and take him out of the UNIFIL area. . . . But the thing is, your

hands are tied. . . . I don't assert the sovereign powers of the country. I catch him, there's nobody to turn him over to, I take him out of UNIFIL area and let him go. . . . I usually give him a ride back. It became so ridiculous, the morale of [the]soldiers was being affected. (Interview with the author, October 26, 1982)

Guksel's complaint that "there's nobody to turn him over to" captured the essence of UNIFIL's dilemma. Faced with an impotent central government, UNIFIL became locked into a static conception of its role, as a buffer between Haddad's enclave to the south and a PLO-controlled zone to the north. In effect, the most significant Palestinian military emplacements were not within the UNIFIL area—where no artillery was permitted—but in a zone north of the Litani River virtually controlled by the PLO. Palestinian guerrillas and their leftist allies in the Lebanese National Movement also controlled a series of checkpoints leading to Beirut, site of the PLO's political headquarters.

If UNIFIL was primarily a buffer, the mission of the Beirut Multinational Force closely linked its fate to the viability of the Lebanese central government. In this case, a peace-keeping operation in a weak state extended a broad commitment to assisting the government in restoring stability within its capital. The Lebanese army was clearly not prepared to undertake this task; so MNF contingents undertook to train the Lebanese army. Ultimately, the MNF was drawn into serving as a substitute army in combat against the regime's opponents. Even before this process came to full fruition, opponents of the regime were challenging the basic mission of the force, which was so closely identified with the regime. At first the aim was to discredit it totally, and finally it was targeted directly.

Undoubtedly, the erosion of domestic Lebanese consent for the deployment of the Beirut MNF was related to its auspices as an operation composed of Western contingents whose governments supported the regime of President Amin Jumayyil. It is important to emphasize that disenchantment with the MNF was not manifested until months after its deployment. Initially, the operation appeared to be popular, according to Ghassan Tuéni, former Lebanese ambassador to the United Nations: "People seem to be agreeable to an American-sponsored force, and tend to trust it more. Even the so-called enemies of America—I mean the leftist parties and the Palestinians—seem to be very agreeable to having American guarantees and assurances. They think the multinational force is more credible and they think the Americans will be fair and will protect them, even against a Lebanese army that is, in all candor, still debatable." (interview with author, November 8, 1982).

Why did the MNF's honeymoon end? The cause may be traced to the increasing unpopularity of the government it supported. The near-unanimous election of Amin Jumayyil to the presidency by the Lebanese parliament, shortly after the assassination of his brother in September 1982, created an illusory image of consensus. Over time, it became clear that many elements in Lebanese society viewed the president as a minoritarian figure. Ruling through the Maronite-dominated Kata'ib (Phalangist) party, Amin Jumayyil perpetuated a regime based on Christian privilege and avoided serious efforts at national conciliation.

In these circumstances, opponents of the regime in the Druze and Shi'a communities became increasingly disenchanted with Jumayyil, and they received strong regional backing from Syria and Iran. The Druze community, more homogeneous and more geographically concentrated, also had more definable leadership in the person of Walid Jumblatt. Jumblatt was primarily supported by Syria, but he kept channels of communication open to Israel as well.

The Shi'a, by contrast, posed a more fundamental threat to the regime because they were less homogeneous than the Druze and there was no single person to talk to in seeking their cooperation. Not only did the Shi'a lack a unified leadership, but their grievances in different geographic sectors—be it the Bika or the south or Beirut—were different grievances. This community was mobilized in a way that was potentially dangerous both to the regime and to the Multinational Force because its members engaged in less conventional tactics of opposition, including terrorism. Shi'a dissidents were also supported by outside actors, including Syria as well as Iran.

As dissent against the Jumayyil regime increased, Lebanese authorities hoped that the MNF would be willing to engage in enforcement actions, ultimately including combat with the regime's opponents. The more President Jumayyil came under challenge, the more he tried to use the Multinational Force in this way and the more he succeeded in getting the MNF to act in this way. In the escalation that ensued, the MNF's mission could no longer be defined strictly in peace-keeping terms. In the fall of 1983, when the American battleship *New Jersey* provided artillery backing for the Lebanese army in its fight with the Druze, this could only be construed as intervention.

Progress in Peace Making

Progress in peace making is the key to determining the life cycle of an international force. Such ventures cannot be initiated unless some peace making has already occurred—the consent of key actors won

and a lid placed on the intensity of the conflict. The degree of peace making which precedes deployment of an international operation determines how difficult the mission will be. In the absence of sufficient peace making to secure the consent of all relevant parties—that is, those capable of disrupting the mission—one may expect enforcement measures to be required eventually.

Yet, if peace making were fully successful, the international force would be unnecessary, its presence superfluous. In theory, at the point that peace-making succeeds, the force should be withdrawn. One rationale for introducing an international force into a conflict (whether interstate or civil) is that its very presence will facilitate the resolution of underlying conflicts. Ironically, however, in the case of buffer forces, there is inevitable tension between a static force mission and dynamic diplomacy. If the presence of peace-keepers engenders a tolerable status quo, the incentive for aggressive diplomacy declines. A frequent critique, for example, of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, is that its effect has been to freeze the conflict between Greeks and Turks, rather than resolve it (James 1989).

What are appropriate expectations for diplomacy during the tenure of an international force? Who is best suited to conduct the diplomacy—the sponsors of an international force (providing parallel diplomatic auspices) or an alternative negotiator? It seems to me that it is desirable to separate the auspices of peace making from those of peace keeping. If the identity and sponsorship of the peace-keepers is distinct from those of the mediators charged with resolving underlying disputes, there is a better chance of insulating the one from a negative outcome to the other.

The two multinational operations under American sponsorship in the Middle East reveal the pitfalls of parallel auspices for peace-keepers and diplomats. On the surface, the success to date of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai may seem to vindicate parallel auspices, since the framers of the Camp David accords for peace between Israel and Egypt also negotiated the MFO's mandate. In the event that anti-American (or broader anti-Western) dissent became pervasive in Egypt or led to a change of regime, however, the status of the American-dominated MFO could well be jeopardized.

The Beirut Multinational Force was also a product of American diplomacy. As usual, the expectation was that the peace-keepers' presence would facilitate further negotiations, ultimately creating a situation in which the MNF would no longer be needed. Instead, what actually transpired was that the American-negotiated accords of May 17, 1983, between Lebanon and Israel called into question the neutrality of the American-dominated Beirut MNF. Conversely, participation in the MNF, whose activities were viewed as progressively more partisan in

favor of Lebanese incumbents, weakened the ability of the United States to pose as an honest broker.

In the case of UNIFIL, it is curious that the customary expectations of a link between peace keeping and peace making were not raised at the time of deployment. The twin expectations of Security Council resolution 425, that Israel would withdraw its forces to the international border and that the Palestinian resistance would cease its guerrilla attacks against Israel, were both unfulfilled. Yet the United Nations did not activate a diplomatic response as long as the level of violence in southern Lebanon remained at a tolerable level and UNIFIL performed its buffer function relatively well.

It was only in spring 1981, after violence escalated in Lebanon, that mediation was tried. The United States responded to a "missile crisis" prompted by Syria's introduction of SA-6 missiles into the Beka, by sending Special Envoy Philip Habib to dissuade Israel from carrying out its threat to remove the missiles by force. Then, in July 1981 violence in southern Lebanon rose when the PLO unleashed artillery and rockets from north of UNIFIL lines against Israeli settlements in Galilee. Israel responded with unprecedented air strikes along the Litani and Zahrani rivers and in Beirut. Diplomacy then occurred under dual auspices, when a July 24 accord was concluded by Philip Habib with Israel and by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim with the PLO. This device was necessitated by the absence of U.S. diplomatic relations with the PLO. Although the accord was not a formal cease-fire agreement, it endured remarkably well, and in the eleven months prior to the second Israeli invasion, the UNIFIL commander, General William Callaghan, reported, "incidents were minimal in UNIFIL's area of operation, infiltration was minimal, and the incidents from Lebanon into Israel that year were none" (interview with author, November 9, 1982).

UNIFIL's record reveals the pitfalls in relying on a peace-keeping force as a stopgap when the underlying conflict is unresolved. Once Lebanon's two powerful neighbors contested each other's spheres of influence in the strife-torn country, negating the "red lines" agreement that had tacitly governed their conduct since 1976, southern Lebanon was an easily available playing field for their competing ambitions. More fundamentally, as long as Lebanon's civil conflict simmered and the country lacked the institutions (army and police) vital for asserting the central government's authority, the peace-keeping force was operating in a vacuum that invited penetration by external interveners.

Operational Variables

Defining the Mandate

The mandate of an international force is defined by the sponsoring intergovernmental organization or multilateral group. Mandates may

be differentiated in terms of their clarity and precision and the expectations of parties to the conflict and troop contributors when they embark on the mission. Interpretation of an operation's mandate depends in part on whether it is static or dynamic. In a dynamic environment, there must be consensual and predictable means to interpret and modify a mandate once a mission comes under challenge.

In this respect, conventional IO auspices present considerable advantages. The means for interpretation of United Nations force mandates reflect consensual organizational procedures. After an initial mandate is set through a resolution of the Security Council (or, occasionally, the General Assembly), a decision to redefine the mandate or provide new instructions requires a new enabling resolution.

In UNIFIL's case, the peace-keepers settled into a static conception of their role, and no initiatives were taken to modify the original mandate. Yet Security Council resolution 425 did include a dynamic component charging UNIFIL with assisting the government of Lebanon in restoring its authority in the south. In one serious effort to implement this responsibility, UNIFIL attempted to incorporate units of the Lebanese army into its area of operation. It did so pursuant to a new Security Council resolution authorizing the pursuit of this objective. Ultimately, two Lebanese battalions did reach the south, although their incorporation in UNIFIL's operational command rather than in an autonomous zone reduced their effectiveness as a symbol of the reconstruction or empowerment of the Lebanese army (Weinberger 1983, 350-54).

For an ad hoc multilateral operation, the means of interpreting or revising a mandate are rarely clear-cut. The definition of the mandate of the Beirut Multinational Force was encumbered by the peculiar circumstances at the force's inception. MNF I performed its task expeditiously in supervising the withdrawal of PLO fighters from West Beirut in the wake of the Israeli siege of August 1982. Despite written American guarantees for the security of non-combatants remaining in Palestinian refugee camps, this responsibility was never publicly acknowledged as part of the mandate of MNF I. When the peace-keepers withdrew after sixteen days, they declared that they had successfully performed their mission, but withdrawal created a legacy of bitterness among the Lebanese when the Sabra-Shatila massacres rapidly followed. Former Lebanese prime minister Sa'ib Salam charged: "Without any formal notice, they [the Americans] withdrew against the engagement they gave us and they gave the Palestinians. . . . They left too soon and they were responsible no doubt for those massacres, horrible massacres" (interview with author, November 9, 1982).

The fatal flaw in creating the reconstituted Multinational Force was

that it was introduced in a crisis atmosphere right after the massacres. The contributors simply resurrected the framework of MNF I, superimposing it on the new situation without redefinition. Using the same basic diplomatic instruments—bilateral exchange of letters between troop contributors and the Lebanese government—the new mandate envisioned a vague function of helping the Lebanese government restore "sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area." As opposed to the firm end point of thirty days originally designated for MNF I, no target date was set for its successor's departure and there was no criterion by which to determine when the mission of the force was complete. It was entirely open-ended.

The MNF had no mechanism analogous to Security Council resolutions for redefining its mandate. There was much ambiguity, yielding a progression from naive optimism at the beginning that the MNF could maintain a low-profile commitment to a situation in which, as civil strife in Lebanon rose, a new level of commitment could not be defined. Since the existing level of commitment was not viable, each individual troop contributor was faced with a stark choice: either to withdraw or to escalate. They could not maintain their existing positions, and they had no systematic mechanism for redefining their commitment.

A fundamental characteristic of the Beirut Multinational Force was its dynamic nature, its progressive redefinition. Although turning points may be identified, they were defined by the outside environment, by diplomatic and military developments in Lebanon and in the region which were not intrinsic to the Beirut force but affected its capacity to function. The first, a diplomatic development, was the May 17, 1983, accord negotiated by the United States between Israel and Lebanon, which was unpopular in Lebanon and opposed by Syria. The accord clouded the environment in which the MNF functioned. The second, and critical military development, was the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Shuf mountains in September 1983. Although this occurred south of the Beirut locale where the MNF was deployed, it changed the perception of Lebanese parties toward the Multinational Force. Renewed civil strife in the Shuf strained the resources of the Lebanese army, and American backing of the Lebanese army in its combat with Druze dissidents undermined the MNF's posture of neutrality. A final development, decisively wounding the already weak force, was the attack on the American and French compounds in October 1983. It was then only a matter of time before the MNF withdrew.

The mission of the MNF was dynamic because diplomacy had failed, and the consequences of this failure were reflected in the deteriorating environment for the international operation. Yet diplomatic success

might also have led to an expansive, dynamic mission. As proposed by the Lebanese government and backed in principle by the United States, a diplomatic agreement for the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon would have led to an enlargement of the Multinational Force and its area of deployment. In many ways, the dynamism of a mandate for collective interveners directly responds to the outcome of the civil conflict they aspire to contain.

Coordination

Coordination is the variable for which the choice of auspices of a peace-keeping force makes the greatest difference. To understand why, it is necessary to distinguish between operational factors promoting effective coordination within a force and factors promoting an image of neutrality.

On an operational level, coordination is maximized by formation of a unified command structure. In theory, a force under either IO or multinational auspices could fulfill this requirement. In practice, UN forces have consistently imposed a joint command; multinational forces have not always done so. Other relevant operational variables are the distribution of influence among troop contributors; willingness to share costs and casualties; and compatibility of foreign policy objectives.

The image of neutrality fostered by traditional peace-keeping forces is best promoted by political heterogeneity among troop contributors. The United Nations has pursued this goal through the principles of balanced geographic distribution among troop contributors and the conscious exclusion of great powers and states with a direct foreign policy interest in the outcome of a given conflict. The geographically balanced force, however, may suffer somewhat in its operational effectiveness because of differences in military traditions and training among units.

UNIFIL's experience substantiates these generalizations. UNIFIL benefited from a clearly defined chain of command. The commander of each contingent reported to the force commander, who in turn reported to the UN secretary-general. Any major dispute over how the mandate should be interpreted or proposal for redefining it required a decision by the Security Council.

Nonetheless, variations among contingents selected on the basis of balanced geographic representation led to considerable diversity in practice. The French battalion, which became involved in intense clashes with Palestinian guerrillas, was deemed "overqualified" for its peace-keeping duties and left within one year. A French logistical unit

was subsequently invited to guard UNIFIL headquarters, which had come under attack by Major Haddad, after which Haddad never again ventured to attack the site. The Fiji battalion, stationed alongside the Tyre pocket, earned a reputation for toughness in dealing with guerrilla infiltrations and suffered many casualties as a result. By contrast, the Senegalese were known to be lax in supervising the PLO, and the Nepalese became quite cozy with Haddad's militia. Thus, unified command did not always translate into standardized practice.

On the surface, it may seem that whereas the political homogeneity of the Beirut MNF detracted from an image of neutrality, the compatibility among Western-trained military units should have enhanced operational effectiveness. There are several reasons why it did not, the most important of which was the absence of a unified chain of command. The MNF was really three (and, once a small British contingent joined, three and a half) forces, each essentially making its own strategic decisions. Whatever mechanisms there were for cooperation—such as daily liaison committee meetings—were merely tactical. The lack of strategic coordination reflected disparity in the objectives that led each of the countries to contribute its forces to the MNF.

Several subordinate hypotheses may be advanced to account for the diversity of incentives and mechanisms for coordination in an international venture. First, asymmetry of influence among troop contributors, especially domination of a force by a single country, is antithetical to effective coordination, unless there is consensus on a unified command structure led by the dominant state. For the MNF, asymmetry was reflected in American domination of the mediation setting the initial frame of reference for the operation. Over the longer term, the United States had disproportionate influence over the regional actors, and therefore local parties turned to the United States to resolve the conflict. The French were sensitive about American domination, concerned that France might be seen as following the American lead. In the Italian case, this concern was most pronounced among the Communists (then members of the ruling coalition), who were uncomfortable about participating in an American-dominated force.

Second, incentives for coordination are determined by whether troop contributors have compatible foreign policy interests at stake in an international operation. Do all participants see the host state as intrinsically important? In this case, Lebanon was not intrinsically important, but the outcome of the Lebanese conflict would tangibly affect the regional policies of the Americans and, to a lesser extent, the French. Is participating in peace-keeping operations considered valuable in its own right (as, for example, among Scandinavian nations, which have a tradition of contributing to UN forces)? This perception

was not manifested either in the United States or in France. The Italians, for their part, indicated that participating in the MNF was important because they were being taken seriously and consulted by NATO allies and because it furthered the recent emphasis in Italian foreign policy on a more active Mediterranean posture (interviews with Egidio Ortona, former Italian ambassador to the United States, November 8, 1984, and Dr. Maurizio Cremasco, Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 7, 1984). None of these incentives had anything to do with the intrinsic value of peace-keeping.

Finally, coordination is promoted if troop contributors are willing to share costs and casualties fairly evenly. This factor depends primarily on domestic decision making in each contributing state. On an operational level, one relevant question is who serves in the international force. Are they conscripts? Are they volunteers? Are they professional soldiers? Are they Foreign Legion? All these factors influence sensitivity to casualties. For example, if troops are derived from the French Foreign Legion, not only are they professionals, but they may not even be French. Obviously, if an eighteen-year-old Italian draftee is killed, public reaction is different than if a French Foreign Legion soldier is killed.

In addition, how do the professional military personnel in each country feel about the value of the peace keeping? Do they think the experience is useful, for training purposes? There is quite a variation in attitudes among contributors, based in part on what their other opportunities are for training in a foreign environment. Finally, how important is the professional military in domestic decision making? To illustrate, the record shows that the American military consistently opposed participation in the MNF. By contrast, the Italian military was very enthusiastic, seeing the venture as invaluable training and as an opportunity to raise the institutional stature of the Italian army.

The policy implications of willingness to sustain costs and casualties for a force with a dynamic mandate boil down to a question of whether each contributor is willing to take risks. The Lebanese government continually urged that the MNF be expanded to be sent to the Shuf, to the Beirut-Damascus Highway, to any areas from which Israeli or Syrian forces might depart. It was clear that if any of these developments came to pass, the French were more likely to go than the Americans or the Italians.

Would the coordination problems have been resolved by introducing a unified command? Neither French nor Italian spokespersons showed any enthusiasm for a joint command structure as long as the force served under multinational auspices. As a French official at the UN declared, "The best solution is if you have one commander for all the

forces under the umbrella of the UN. . . . I cannot imagine the MNF under one commander. Impossible. . . . The only obstacle is the Americans; they can't go to the UN umbrella" (interview with author, March 1983). At issue was the traditional policy of the United States barring participation in military operations under foreign command.

Capabilities

A final determinant of effectiveness is capabilities. In optimal circumstances, an international force has sufficient capabilities to ward off challenges to the integrity of its area of operation, coupled with restrictive rules of engagement for the use of those capabilities. UN forces have frequently been derided for lacking heavy weapons, that is, "teeth." A multinational force, by contrast, especially with great power contributors, has greatly enhanced capabilities. The relevant question is whether superior military capabilities play a deterrent or provocative role.

One may note that UNIFIL's image of weakness did not primarily stem from a lack of adequate military capabilities. The reason, instead, was the ability of both Palestinian guerrillas and Haddad's militia to encroach on UNIFIL's area of operation with relative impunity. The restrictive rules of engagement by which UNIFIL was bound, permitting soldiers to fire only in self-defense, prevented them from taking the initiative in pursuing encroachers.

UNIFIL's reputation was further undermined when it failed to resist the Israeli forces that overran its positions on June 6, 1982. Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman, director of the PLO Information Office, declared: "They should have employed their capabilities in trying to stop the Israeli invasion. Whether they would have succeeded or not, that's a totally different question. But at least they should have made that effort" (interview with author, March 9, 1983). But Timur Guksel of UNIFIL objected that any attempt to resist the Israelis would have led to heavy casualties: "So you're losing [many UNIFIL] soldiers, for what? For delaying the Israelis fifteen minutes? Symbolically, I wish there was more we could have done, but militarily speaking, it's suicidal" (interview, October 26, 1982).

Undoubtedly, UNIFIL's image of weakness explains the Lebanese government's advocacy of multinational auspices for the new peace-keeping force deployed in the wake of the Israeli invasion. President Jumayyil hoped that the Western troop contributors would possess greater deterrent capabilities. Ultimately, Bassam Torbah, political counselor to the Lebanese Embassy in Paris, reported, Lebanese officials were disappointed and bitter that the MNF contingents were un-

willing to escalate their military backing for the Lebanese army (interview with author, December 14, 1984). Nevertheless, the possession of heavy weapons, coupled with inconsistent rules of engagement for the MNF, became a recipe for escalation. Arguably, possession of visible military capabilities in the field, as well as heavier offshore weapons at the disposal of the Americans and the French, made the Multinational Force "vulnerable to attempts to provoke retaliation" on the part of dissident groups eager to disrupt the status quo (Heilburg and Holst 1986).

Inconsistent rules bred disparate behavior among contingents. For example, when the Italians were asked to join the Lebanese army in house-to-house searches in west Beirut in October, 1982, they refused because, said General Franco Angioni, former force commander of the Italian contingent, they were unwilling to seize weapons from Muslims but not from Christians, as was the Lebanese army plan (interview with the author, November 5, 1984). The French, by contrast agreed to participate in searches. An official of the French Foreign Ministry later indicated that local commanders had acted without consulting the ministry, that they had been reprimanded for insubordination and never did it again (interview, December 1984). The fact remains, however, that the French did participate. The lack of clear rules of engagement help explain why a local commander could agree to a request of this sort from the Lebanese army.

Another issue was the difference in retaliatory measures by the French and the Americans after their MNF contingents came under attack in summer 1983. French spokespersons insist that when they bombed Syrian forces in the Bika, they did so in direct retaliation for attacks upon them; whereas when the Americans unleashed the battleship *New Jersey*, they were inappropriately intervening in civil strife. The Lebanese did not always see these fine distinctions. In both cases, it looked like intervention to those on the other side of the barricades.

The experience of the Beirut MNF reveals that an emphasis on capabilities—insofar as it focuses on the availability of weapons—is a spurious issue in predicting the effectiveness of an international force. The relevant issue, instead, is the willingness of troop contributors to engage in enforcement actions in implementing their mandate. In cases of civil strife, nonetheless, the impression of military strength may affect the perceptions of those with an interest in disrupting the force—tending either to deter or to provoke.

Lessons for a New Era

At the time that UNIFIL and the MNF were deployed, Lebanese civil strife appeared to be an aberration. The degree of fragmentation in

Lebanese society, featuring conflict among seventeen recognized sects as well as within individual sects, was unusually complex. Moreover, the internationalization of the conflict, precipitating unilateral interventions by both neighbors and collective intervention by extraregional actors was rare for such a small country, especially one that was not considered strategically vital in the cold war.

Yet the patterns of instability unleashed in many parts of the world once the cold war ended make the lessons of the Lebanese experience more relevant than ever. Lebanon seemed to be an extreme example of Third World conflict in the 1970s and 1980s, but developments in the early 1990s provide ample analogies not only in the Third World but in Europe and the former Soviet Union. Ethnic particularism has intensified both in habitually fragile states and in states previously considered viable which have recently disintegrated (Helman and Ratner 1992; Ryan 1990b; Goodby 1992).

Simultaneous with these manifestations of disorder, an increasing consensus arose that the United Nations should be empowered to cope more effectively with civil conflicts as well as international disputes. The remarkable popularity of the peace-keeping mechanism in the years since 1988 gave rise to an unprecedented number of new operations. Whereas some resembled traditional buffer forces, the prevalence of ethnic strife bred conditions whereby international forces increasingly engage in collective intervention.

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in *An Agenda for Peace*, suggested an ambitious set of guidelines for the new generation of peace-keeping forces, the most ambitious of which he described as "peace-enforcement units:"

The mission of forces under Article 43 [of the United Nations Charter] would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. . . . This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the [Security] Council consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. . . . They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. (Boutros-Ghali 1992a, 26-27)

Indeed, Boutros-Ghali portrays missions entailing different degrees of risk which might oblige United Nations troops to engage in enforcement actions. These include the provision of protection to humanitarian relief, military assistance to civil authorities, and maintenance or

restoration of cease-fire agreements that may be breached by the signatory parties.

Such diverse and complex peace-keeping missions will have to modify both the contextual and the operational premises of traditional operations if they are to function effectively. In the context of civil strife in a fragmented society, it is not possible to assume or rely upon consent of all the relevant parties, either at the time of deployment or during the life cycle of the force. If peace-keepers are invited by incumbent authorities, they may be asked to neutralize the opposition of insurgents to their mission, and they must determine what kinds of enforcement actions may be undertaken in those circumstances. Moreover, identification with one side in a civil conflict will engender an image of partisanship that makes it impossible to serve as an honest broker in mediating the underlying conflict (Weiss 1993, 58-59).

On an operational level, undertaking missions that may require escalation under challenge gives rise to heightened demands for dynamic mandates, consensual mechanisms for coordination, and adequate but discreetly deployed capabilities. In the assessment of Thomas Weiss, such missions will "require a level of military professionalism and discipline not commonly found in previous UN peacekeeping operations. They would necessitate participation by the armies of major powers. Accomplishing the tasks in these operations would go far beyond both the expectations and the capacities of most countries that have contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War" (Weiss 1993, 61).

The perceived necessity of including the forces of major powers in peace-keeping efforts raises the issue of the auspices under which they might serve. Even as the United Nations becomes more favorably disposed to the inclusion of great power troop contributors than it was in the past, the willingness of these states to serve under UN command is still questionable. The traditional policy of the United States, of allowing its forces to serve only under American command, was reaffirmed after its bruising experience of peace keeping in Somalia (Peck 1994).

Of the "second-generation" peace-keeping missions, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) most closely resembled the experience of the Beirut Multinational Force. As in the Lebanese case, peace-keepers entered a turbulent civil conflict with an open-ended mandate to assist in the reconstruction of the country. After displaying a similar pattern of escalated commitment followed by abrupt withdrawal of troop contributors, UNOSOM was no more able than its Lebanese predecessor to address the fundamental causes of the Somali conflict.

The peace-keeping operation in Somalia experienced a curious switch from multilateral to United Nations *auspices* in mid-course. The Bush administration initiated the operation as an emergency relief mission in December 1992. After three years of civil war in which over 500,000 Somalis died in combat or from famine, the United States mobilized a multinational force to provide security so that relief agencies could supply food to starving people. President Bush announced, however, that the United States was willing to command the force for only a short time, and the United Nations assumed command of the operation in May 1993 with a Turkish commander in charge. The United States retained a logistical unit of twenty-seven hundred persons under United Nations command. Since this was not a combat unit, the UN command was not considered a departure from traditional practice. The deputy commander of UNOSOM was an American, moreover, and a Quick Reaction Force of thirteen hundred was attached to UNOSOM, while remaining under exclusive American command.

The unusual arrangements whereby the United States achieved a prominent role in a UN force reflected the enthusiasm of the newly elected American president Bill Clinton for participation in UN peace-keeping, under a policy of "assertive multilateralism." Yet the image of an American-dominated force quickly became problematic in the Somali civil setting, for reasons analogous to the image of partisanship of the Beirut MNF.

One comparable problem was the ambiguous *definition of UNOSOM's mandate*. Just as the MNF mission evolved from a clear mandate for the evacuation of Palestinian guerrillas from Beirut to a far-reaching pledge of restoring stability in the capital, UNOSOM found its mission changing from humanitarian relief to active military enforcement. When the United Nations assumed control from the Americans, the Security Council embraced an open-ended commitment to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-torn country, which was to culminate in the supervision of democratic elections in 1995. Yet once UNOSOM's expanded mission came under challenge, it quickly sought to enforce its mandate by military means.

Upon entering Somalia, UNOSOM could neither seek nor achieve *consent of the parties* to the local conflict. By the time of its deployment, Somalia did not possess even the meager trappings of central government authority that Lebanon could boast in 1982. In conditions of political anarchy, rival clan leaders with small local followings battled each other. The multinational and UN forces that entered Somalia, therefore, did so without a local invitation, on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. As long as the peace-keepers' efforts were concentrated on supervising relief efforts, they enjoyed local popularity. Only

when the UN declared that reconstruction required active efforts to disarm the supporters of rival warlords did the climate change.

At this point, a confrontation evolved between one prominent clan leader, General Mohammed Farah Aidid, and the United Nations force. Aidid, who commanded a mere three hundred to five hundred lightly armed fighters in the capital city of Mogadishu, resisted the UN efforts to disarm them. In June 1993, Aidid's fighters ambushed and killed twenty-four Pakistani peace-keepers, and the United States responded with strikes by its Quick Reaction Force, supported by air power, against Aidid's positions. In a report to the Security Council in August, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali declared that responsibility for growing hostilities against UN troops "rests squarely with the faction leaders, in particular Mohammed Farah Aidid." He asserted that disarmament of the various clan-based factions "is indispensable for the establishment of peace and security in Somalia" (*New York Times*, August 19, 1993, A3).

A lack of consensus about the redefinition of UNOSOM's mission gave rise to serious problems of *coordination among troop contributors*. Despite the existence of a unified command over the twenty-three-nation force, disagreements over objectives led to cases of insubordination. The most serious incident involved the dismissal in July 1993 of the commander of the Italian contingent after he insisted on waiting for instructions from Rome rather than obey the United Nations commander. The underlying issue was Italy's objection to what its defense minister described as the "Rambo tactics" of the UN in targeting General Aidid. Italy feared that these moves would widen the war and turn the local population against UNOSOM. As the former colonial power, Italy claimed to possess greater insight into Somali politics and society and advocated continued negotiations with Aidid and renewed emphasis on the humanitarian relief effort (*New York Times*, July 12, 1993, A5, July 15, 1993, A8, August 15, 1993, A12).

Nonetheless, over the coming months the Clinton administration expressed determination to continue the pursuit of General Aidid. In so doing, the United States drew upon its superior military *capabilities*. That the Quick Reaction Force operated outside of UNOSOM's chain of command increased the temptation for the United States to take unilateral measures. The use of American forces in targeting Aidid's positions in Mogadishu in July 1993 was followed by the introduction of an elite unit of Army Rangers whose mission was to target the Somali warlord. Yet on October 3, a disastrous raid against Aidid's top aides led to heavy American losses, with eighteen dead and seventy-five wounded. This turning point, analogous to the bombing of the American marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983, led to a change

of heart by the Clinton administration. Under heavy congressional pressure, the president announced a phased withdrawal of American forces over the next six months, which was completed by March 31, 1994.

This tale is sadly reminiscent of the demise of the Beirut Multinational Force. Because Somalia, like Lebanon, was not considered vital to the strategic interests of the United States, once the risk of casualties became high and the mission began looking like an indefinite quagmire, it was likely to be terminated. Yet because of its choice of auspices, UNOSOM was not immediately doomed by the American departure. Although other Western troop contributors left along with the United States, a force of nineteen thousand remained in place, drawn from Third World countries.

In its latest incarnation, UNOSOM reverted to its initial emphasis on safeguarding the delivery of humanitarian relief in Somalia. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced that the force would continue to serve until March 1995. The long-term contribution of UNOSOM to stability in this troubled country would ultimately depend on the link between *peace-keeping and peace making*. The United Nations made many attempts to foster reconciliation among Somalia's competing warlords and to negotiate arrangements for a transitional government and national elections. On March 22, 1994, the leaders of all fifteen Somali factions, including General Aidid, signed a Declaration of National Reconciliation agreeing in principle to the formation of an interim government. The declaration did not spell out the distribution of power for a new government, however, and there were grounds for pessimism that a viable agreement would emerge.

In retrospect, UNOSOM erred in striving to foster Somalia's reconstruction without an adequate commitment by troop contributors or reliable partners within Somali society. The cases of Lebanon and Somalia illustrate the perils of introducing peace-keepers in ongoing civil conflicts. Nations that send their forces into a strife-torn society had best be prepared to sustain the costs of collective intervention, or else refrain from participating in such missions in the first place.